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<channel>
	<title>Sussex Undergraduate Philosophy Society</title>
	<atom:link href="http://www.supsoc.org/feed/podcast/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
	<link>http://www.supsoc.org</link>
	<description>Free audio recordings of our weekly undergraduate philosophy seminars</description>
	<pubDate>Wed, 17 Mar 2010 16:00:20 +0000</pubDate>
	
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	<itunes:summary>SUPSOC provide a platform for the development of philosophical thought at undergraduate level. Our weekly seminars host discussions on a range of topics and thinkers from all over the philosophical spectrum.

SUPSOC seminars are held each Wednesday at the University of Sussex, Brighton, UK. Audio recordings of many of our events are made available online. Visit our website at www.supsoc.org to find out more, and to join the discussion.</itunes:summary>
	<itunes:subtitle>Free audio recordings of our weekly undergraduate philosophy seminars</itunes:subtitle>
	<itunes:author>SUPSOC</itunes:author>
	<itunes:image href="http://www.supsoc.org/wp-content/themes/themasterplan_tma_v1.4/tma/images/podcast-image.jpg" />
	
	<itunes:category text="Society &amp; Culture">
		<itunes:category text="Philosophy" />
	</itunes:category>
	<itunes:category text="Education">
		<itunes:category text="Higher Education" />
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	<itunes:keywords>philosophy, undergraduate philosophy society, supsoc, undergraduate philosophy</itunes:keywords>
	<itunes:explicit>no</itunes:explicit>
	<itunes:owner>
		<itunes:name>SUPSOC</itunes:name>
		<itunes:email>hello@supsoc.org</itunes:email>
	</itunes:owner>
			<item>
		<title>Jacob Berkson: Moore, Skepticism and Certainty *</title>
		<link>http://www.supsoc.org/2010/02/03/jacob-berkson-moore-skepticism-and-certainty/</link>
		<comments>http://www.supsoc.org/2010/02/03/jacob-berkson-moore-skepticism-and-certainty/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 03 Feb 2010 16:00:45 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Peter</dc:creator>
		
		<category><![CDATA[Past Events]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.supsoc.org/?p=973</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[G.E. Moore claimed not only to be able to know many propositions about how things were independently of the way they seemed to him but to be able to know them with certainty. I defend his claims and at the same time try to give a diagnosis of why people are suspicious of Moore’s achievements. [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><img class="alignright size-medium wp-image-1062" title="moore2" src="http://www.supsoc.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/02/moore2-300x227.jpg" alt="moore2" width="300" height="227" />G.E. Moore claimed not only to be able to know many propositions about how things were independently of the way they seemed to him but to be able to know them with certainty. I defend his claims and at the same time try to give a diagnosis of why people are suspicious of Moore’s achievements. The general strategy is to read Moore as a (proto)-externalist about knowledge who is attempting to apply the insights of externalism to thought about knowledge from the inside. With a bit of luck what emerges is a refutation of scepticism and a vindication of a realist metaphysics.</p>
<p><strong>Jacob Berkson</strong> is an associate tutor at the University of Sussex</p>
<h3>Seminar Recording</h3>
<p><br />
<a href="http://media.supsoc.org/past-events/2010/moore-scepticism-certainty.mp3">Download recording (.mp3 format)</a></p>
<p><a href="http://media.supsoc.org/past-events/2010/berkson-on-moore-on certainty-draft-1.pdf">Download the paper (.pdf format)</a></p>
]]></content:encoded>
			<wfw:commentRss>http://www.supsoc.org/2010/02/03/jacob-berkson-moore-skepticism-and-certainty/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
<enclosure url="http://media.supsoc.org/past-events/2010/moore-scepticism-certainty.mp3" length="55775142" type="audio/mpeg" />
	<itunes:summary>G.E. Moore claimed not only to be able to know many propositions about how things were independently of the way they seemed to him but to be able to know them with certainty. I defend his claims and at the same time try to give a diagnosis of why people are suspicious of Moore’s achievements. The general strategy is to read Moore as a (proto)-externalist about knowledge who is attempting to apply the insights of externalism to thought about knowledge from the inside. With a bit of luck what emerges is a refutation of scepticism and a vindication of a realist metaphysics.
Jacob Berkson is an associate tutor at the University of Sussex
Seminar Recording

Download recording (.mp3 format)
Download the paper (.pdf format)</itunes:summary>
<itunes:subtitle>G.E. Moore claimed not only to be able to know many propositions about how things were independently of the way they seemed to him but to be able to know them with certainty. I defend his claims and at the same time try to give a diagnosis of why [...]</itunes:subtitle>
<itunes:author>Jacob Berkson</itunes:author>
	</item>
		<item>
		<title>Chris Allsobrook: Ideological Pitfalls of Immanent Criticism *</title>
		<link>http://www.supsoc.org/2010/01/27/chris-allsobrook-ideological-pitfalls-of-immanent-critique/</link>
		<comments>http://www.supsoc.org/2010/01/27/chris-allsobrook-ideological-pitfalls-of-immanent-critique/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 27 Jan 2010 16:00:33 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Peter</dc:creator>
		
		<category><![CDATA[Past Events]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.supsoc.org/?p=970</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Ideology criticism since Marx has usually  been characterised as a dialectical form of ‘immanent’ or internal  criticism which demonstrates inconsistency, between P: an agent’s  beliefs, ideals, principles, practices etc, whereby certain practical  conditions (C) appear legitimate, and Q: ideas/practices  etc an agent acknowledges/engages in, whereby C appears illegitimate.  What [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Ideology criticism since Marx has usually  been characterised as a dialectical form of ‘immanent’ or internal  criticism which demonstrates inconsistency, between P: an agent’s  beliefs, ideals, principles, practices etc, whereby certain practical  conditions (C) appear legitimate, and Q: ideas/practices  etc an agent acknowledges/engages in, whereby C appears illegitimate.  What motivates this form of ideology criticism is the hope that people  will be unwilling to engage in certain practices or endorse certain  ideas that implicate them in domination once they see this inconsistency.  The aim here is that one’s interlocutor drops P. Dispelling  ideological illusions which obscure domination, it is hoped, clears  a path to emancipation. Such immanent ideology criticism does not confront  society with a transcendent set of moral injunctions, but shows people  how their own ideas either help perpetuate their oppression, or obscure  their part in the domination of others.</p>
<p>However such a mode of ideology criticism  tends to backfire on the critic. Like a suicide bomber, the immanent  critic goes down with her opponent. If I’ve taken your  position, in order to refute it, then I too have been refuted.  In fact the immanent critic wants her interlocutor to drop P,  but all the method demonstrates is inconsistency between P and  Q. Why not drop Q? Why not resign oneself to inconsistency  in this muddled world? In this paper I examine a series of attempts  by some metaphysically ambitious critics such as Plato, Hegel, Marx  and Adorno to construct a model of immanent criticism with which one  may survive one’s suicide attack. The problem, I argue, is that by  refusing to face up to martyrdom like Socrates, they end up producing  increasingly sophisticated and effective vehicles of ideology (an ‘immanent  criticism’ which is not what it claims to be). The remedy I suggest  is to suggest a remedy.</p>
<p><strong>Chris Allsobrook</strong> is an assosciate tutor at the University of Sussex who is currently working towards a DPhil on Ideology, Genealogy and Immanent Critique. Further information regarding his research and publications can be found on his <a href="http://www.sussex.ac.uk/philosophy/profile195130.html">staff profile</a>.</p>
<h3>Seminar Recording</h3>
<p><br />
<a href="http://media.supsoc.org/past-events/2010/ideological-pitfalls-immanent-criticism.mp3">Download recording (.mp3 format)</a></p>
<p><a href="http://media.supsoc.org/past-events/2010/ideological-pitfalls-immanent-criticism.pdf">Download the paper (.pdf format)</a></p>
]]></content:encoded>
			<wfw:commentRss>http://www.supsoc.org/2010/01/27/chris-allsobrook-ideological-pitfalls-of-immanent-critique/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
<enclosure url="http://media.supsoc.org/past-events/2010/ideological-pitfalls-immanent-criticism.mp3" length="48508976" type="audio/mpeg" />
	<itunes:summary>Ideology criticism since Marx has usually  been characterised as a dialectical form of ‘immanent’ or internal  criticism which demonstrates inconsistency, between P: an agent’s  beliefs, ideals, principles, practices etc, whereby certain practical  conditions (C) appear legitimate, and Q: ideas/practices  etc an agent acknowledges/engages in, whereby C appears illegitimate.  What motivates this form of ideology criticism is the hope that people  will be unwilling to engage in certain practices or endorse certain  ideas that implicate them in domination once they see this inconsistency.  The aim here is that one’s interlocutor drops P. Dispelling  ideological illusions which obscure domination, it is hoped, clears  a path to emancipation. Such immanent ideology criticism does not confront  society with a transcendent set of moral injunctions, but shows people  how their own ideas either help perpetuate their oppression, or obscure  their part in the domination of others.
However such a mode of ideology criticism  tends to backfire on the critic. Like a suicide bomber, the immanent  critic goes down with her opponent. If I’ve taken your  position, in order to refute it, then I too have been refuted.  In fact the immanent critic wants her interlocutor to drop P,  but all the method demonstrates is inconsistency between P and  Q. Why not drop Q? Why not resign oneself to inconsistency  in this muddled world? In this paper I examine a series of attempts  by some metaphysically ambitious critics such as Plato, Hegel, Marx  and Adorno to construct a model of immanent criticism with which one  may survive one’s suicide attack. The problem, I argue, is that by  refusing to face up to martyrdom like Socrates, they end up producing  increasingly sophisticated and effective vehicles of ideology (an ‘immanent  criticism’ which is not what it claims to be). The remedy I suggest  is to suggest a remedy.
Chris Allsobrook is an assosciate tutor at the University of Sussex who is currently working towards a DPhil on Ideology, Genealogy and Immanent Critique. Further information regarding his research and publications can be found on his staff profile.
Seminar Recording

Download recording (.mp3 format)
Download the paper (.pdf format)</itunes:summary>
<itunes:subtitle>Ideology criticism since Marx has usually  been characterised as a dialectical form of ‘immanent’ or internal  criticism which demonstrates inconsistency, between P: an agent’s  beliefs, ideals, principles, practices etc, whereby certain [...]</itunes:subtitle>
<itunes:author>Chris Allsobrook</itunes:author>
<itunes:keywords>SUPSOC</itunes:keywords>
	</item>
		<item>
		<title>Mike Champion: Object-Oriented Philosophy: Weird Realism and aesthetics as first philosophy *</title>
		<link>http://www.supsoc.org/2010/01/20/mike-champion-object-oriented-philosophy-weird-realism-and-aesthetics-as-first-philosophy/</link>
		<comments>http://www.supsoc.org/2010/01/20/mike-champion-object-oriented-philosophy-weird-realism-and-aesthetics-as-first-philosophy/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 20 Jan 2010 16:00:23 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Peter</dc:creator>
		
		<category><![CDATA[Past Events]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.supsoc.org/?p=967</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Object-oriented is a new philosophy that isn&#8217;t shy to engage in full blown metaphysical speculation. This philosophy of objects denounces the centrality of the subject as having privileged access to the world and endorses what approaches a panpsychist understanding of reality. Object-oriented philosophy forms a robust realist ontology of independently existing objects that avoids the [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><img class="alignright size-medium wp-image-968" title="mike-champion" src="http://www.supsoc.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/01/mike-champion-300x213.jpg" alt="mike-champion" width="300" height="213" />Object-oriented is a new philosophy that isn&#8217;t shy to engage in full blown metaphysical speculation. This philosophy of objects denounces the centrality of the subject as having privileged access to the world and endorses what approaches a panpsychist understanding of reality. Object-oriented philosophy forms a robust realist ontology of independently existing objects that avoids the pitfalls of a &#8216;metaphysics of presence&#8217; by recognising the withdrawn subterranean being of every real object. From this insight, object-oriented philosophy is able to escape the obsession with language that has characterized the late 20th century&#8217;s &#8216;linguistic turn&#8217; and  the need to reduce reality only to base &#8216;ultimates&#8217;. This presentation hopes to introduce object-oriented philosophy to the students as Sussex by focusing upon  the claim that aesthetics now becomes first philosophy.</p>
<p><strong>Mike Champion </strong>is a graduate of Nottingham Trent University. He is now studying philosophy independently and writing a <a href="http://avoidingthevoid.wordpress.com/">philosophy blog</a>. He has previously spoken at SUPSOC on <a href="http://www.supsoc.org/2008/10/15/mike-champion-on-biotechnology-and-ethics-in-china/">Biotechnology and Ethics in China</a>.</p>
<h3>Seminar Recording</h3>
<p><br />
<a href="http://media.supsoc.org/past-events/2010/object-oriented-philosophy.mp3">Download recording (.mp3 format)</a></p>
]]></content:encoded>
			<wfw:commentRss>http://www.supsoc.org/2010/01/20/mike-champion-object-oriented-philosophy-weird-realism-and-aesthetics-as-first-philosophy/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
<enclosure url="http://media.supsoc.org/past-events/2010/object-oriented-philosophy.mp3" length="67050255" type="audio/mpeg" />
<enclosure url="http://media.supsoc.org/past-events/2010/object-oriented-philosophy.mp3" length="67050255" type="audio/mpeg" />
	<itunes:summary>Object-oriented is a new philosophy that isnt shy to engage in full blown metaphysical speculation. This philosophy of objects denounces the centrality of the subject as having privileged access to the world and endorses what approaches a panpsychist understanding of reality. Object-oriented philosophy forms a robust realist ontology of independently existing objects that avoids the pitfalls of a metaphysics of presence by recognising the withdrawn subterranean being of every real object. From this insight, object-oriented philosophy is able to escape the obsession with language that has characterized the late 20th centurys linguistic turn and  the need to reduce reality only to base ultimates. This presentation hopes to introduce object-oriented philosophy to the students as Sussex by focusing upon  the claim that aesthetics now becomes first philosophy.
Mike Champion is a graduate of Nottingham Trent University. He is now studying philosophy independently and writing a philosophy blog. He has previously spoken at SUPSOC on Biotechnology and Ethics in China.
Seminar Recording

Download recording (.mp3 format)</itunes:summary>
<itunes:subtitle>Object-oriented is a new philosophy that isnt shy to engage in full blown metaphysical speculation. This philosophy of objects denounces the centrality of the subject as having privileged access to the world and endorses what approaches a [...]</itunes:subtitle>
<itunes:author>Mike Champion</itunes:author>
<itunes:keywords>SUPSOC</itunes:keywords>
	</item>
		<item>
		<title>Dr Mike Beaton on Qualia and Introspection *</title>
		<link>http://www.supsoc.org/2009/12/09/mike-beaton-on-qualia-and-introspection/</link>
		<comments>http://www.supsoc.org/2009/12/09/mike-beaton-on-qualia-and-introspection/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 09 Dec 2009 16:00:34 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Aron</dc:creator>
		
		<category><![CDATA[Past Events]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.supsoc.org/?p=735</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Most people endorse a perceptual or quasi-perceptual account of introspection: introspection is achieved via the detection of internal states of the brain. Imagine the case of pain; it is widely supposed that what I know when I introspect pain is that pain feel like &#8216;this&#8217;, where &#8216;this&#8217; refers to some internal state of my nervous [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><img class="alignright size-medium wp-image-741" title="eyeinthesky" src="http://www.supsoc.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/12/eyeinthesky-227x300.jpg" alt="eyeinthesky" width="227" height="300" />Most people endorse a perceptual or quasi-perceptual account of introspection: introspection is achieved via the detection of internal states of the brain. Imagine the case of pain; it is widely supposed that what I know when I introspect pain is that pain feel like &#8216;this&#8217;, where &#8216;this&#8217; refers to some internal state of my nervous system, which is only contingently related to the functional role of pain (i.e. to withdrawal behaviour, etc.). On the other hand, those who think that there is nothing more to pain than its functional role tend to deny that there are qualia (introspectible feels; what it is like) at all, on the basis that the only model for qualia is the above model, which should be rejected. Here, I will argue that although introspection is not quasi-perceptual, we can still find a place for bona fide (introspectible, but also behaviourally detectable) qualia.</p>
<p><strong>Dr Mike Beaton</strong> is a researcher and an associate tutor at the University of Sussex. He has recently completed a DPhil thesis defending a naturalized account of qualia as subjective aspects of the mind. More information regarding his research and publications can be found on his <a href="http://www.informatics.sussex.ac.uk/users/mjsb20/index.html">website</a>.</p>
<p>This talk was based on Beaton, M. (2009). “Qualia and Introspection.” <em>Journal of Consciousness Studies</em>, 16(5), pp.88-110. This paper is available for download from Dr Beaton&#8217;s <a href="http://www.informatics.sussex.ac.uk/users/mjsb20/publications.html">publication list.</a></p>
<h3>Seminar Recording</h3>
<p><br />
<a href="http://media.supsoc.org/past-events/2009/qualia-and-introspection.mp3">Download recording (.mp3 format)</a></p>
]]></content:encoded>
			<wfw:commentRss>http://www.supsoc.org/2009/12/09/mike-beaton-on-qualia-and-introspection/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
<enclosure url="http://media.supsoc.org/past-events/2009/qualia-and-introspection.mp3" length="55080924" type="audio/mpeg" />
	<itunes:summary>Most people endorse a perceptual or quasi-perceptual account of introspection: introspection is achieved via the detection of internal states of the brain. Imagine the case of pain; it is widely supposed that what I know when I introspect pain is that pain feel like this, where this refers to some internal state of my nervous system, which is only contingently related to the functional role of pain (i.e. to withdrawal behaviour, etc.). On the other hand, those who think that there is nothing more to pain than its functional role tend to deny that there are qualia (introspectible feels; what it is like) at all, on the basis that the only model for qualia is the above model, which should be rejected. Here, I will argue that although introspection is not quasi-perceptual, we can still find a place for bona fide (introspectible, but also behaviourally detectable) qualia.
Dr Mike Beaton is a researcher and an associate tutor at the University of Sussex. He has recently completed a DPhil thesis defending a naturalized account of qualia as subjective aspects of the mind. More information regarding his research and publications can be found on his website.
This talk was based on Beaton, M. (2009). “Qualia and Introspection.” Journal of Consciousness Studies, 16(5), pp.88-110. This paper is available for download from Dr Beatons publication list.
Seminar Recording

Download recording (.mp3 format)</itunes:summary>
<itunes:subtitle>Most people endorse a perceptual or quasi-perceptual account of introspection: introspection is achieved via the detection of internal states of the brain. Imagine the case of pain; it is widely supposed that what I know when I introspect pain is [...]</itunes:subtitle>
<itunes:author>Dr Mike Beaton</itunes:author>
<itunes:keywords>SUPSOC</itunes:keywords>
	</item>
		<item>
		<title>David Pearce on The Abolitionist Project: Should we use biotechnology to abolish suffering throughout the living world? *</title>
		<link>http://www.supsoc.org/2009/11/04/david-pearce-on-the-abolitionist-project/</link>
		<comments>http://www.supsoc.org/2009/11/04/david-pearce-on-the-abolitionist-project/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 04 Nov 2009 16:00:09 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Peter</dc:creator>
		
		<category><![CDATA[Past Events]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.supsoc.org/?p=649</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[This talk is about suffering and how to get rid of it.
I predict we will abolish  suffering throughout the living world.
Our descendants will be animated by gradients of genetically preprogrammed well-being that are orders of magnitude richer than today&#8217;s peak experiences. First, I&#8217;m going to outline why it&#8217;s technically feasible to abolish the biological [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><img class="alignright size-medium wp-image-713" title="trans1" src="http://www.supsoc.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/11/trans1-222x300.jpg" alt="trans1" width="222" height="300" /><span>This talk is about suffering and how to get rid of it.</span></p>
<p>I predict we will abolish  suffering throughout the living world.</p>
<p>Our descendants will be animated by gradients of genetically preprogrammed well-being that are orders of magnitude richer than today&#8217;s peak experiences. <span>First, I&#8217;m going to outline why it&#8217;s <em>technically</em> feasible to abolish the biological substrates of any kind of unpleasant experience - psychological pain as well as physical pain.</span></p>
<p>Secondly,  I&#8217;m going to argue for the overriding <em>moral</em> urgency of the abolitionist project, whether or not one is any kind of ethical utilitarian.</p>
<p>Thirdly, I&#8217;m going to argue why a revolution in biotechnology means it&#8217;s going to happen, albeit not nearly as fast as it should.</p>
<p><strong>David Pearce</strong> is a British philosopher and author of <em><a href="http://www.hedweb.com">The Hedonistic Imperative</a></em>.  With Nick Bostrom, he is co-founder of Humanity+ (formerly known as the World Transhumanist Association). For more information on the Abolitionist Project please visit <a href="http://www.abolitionist.com">www.abolitionist.com</a>.</p>
<h3>Seminar recording</h3>
<p><a href="http://media.supsoc.org/past-events/2009/abolitionist-project.mp3"><br />
Download recording (.mp3 format)</a></p>
]]></content:encoded>
			<wfw:commentRss>http://www.supsoc.org/2009/11/04/david-pearce-on-the-abolitionist-project/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
<enclosure url="http://media.supsoc.org/past-events/2009/abolitionist-project.mp3" length="0" type="" />
	<itunes:summary>This talk is about suffering and how to get rid of it.
I predict we will abolish  suffering throughout the living world.
Our descendants will be animated by gradients of genetically preprogrammed well-being that are orders of magnitude richer than todays peak experiences. First, Im going to outline why its technically feasible to abolish the biological substrates of any kind of unpleasant experience - psychological pain as well as physical pain.
Secondly,  Im going to argue for the overriding moral urgency of the abolitionist project, whether or not one is any kind of ethical utilitarian.
Thirdly, Im going to argue why a revolution in biotechnology means its going to happen, albeit not nearly as fast as it should.
David Pearce is a British philosopher and author of The Hedonistic Imperative.  With Nick Bostrom, he is co-founder of Humanity+ (formerly known as the World Transhumanist Association). For more information on the Abolitionist Project please visit www.abolitionist.com.
Seminar recording

Download recording (.mp3 format)</itunes:summary>
<itunes:subtitle>This talk is about suffering and how to get rid of it.
I predict we will abolish  suffering throughout the living world.
Our descendants will be animated by gradients of genetically preprogrammed well-being that are orders of magnitude richer than [...]</itunes:subtitle>
<itunes:author>David Pearce</itunes:author>
<itunes:keywords>supsoc, sussex undergraduate philosophy society, abolitionist project, biotechnology, ethics, suffering</itunes:keywords>
	</item>
		<item>
		<title>Tomos Lovett: Nothing Is New: After Postmodernism *</title>
		<link>http://www.supsoc.org/2009/10/28/tomos-lovett-nothing-is-new-after-postmodernism/</link>
		<comments>http://www.supsoc.org/2009/10/28/tomos-lovett-nothing-is-new-after-postmodernism/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 28 Oct 2009 16:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Peter</dc:creator>
		
		<category><![CDATA[Past Events]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.supsoc.org/?p=647</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[
In this talk I would like to  address the inherent sociocultual problems of the Postmodernist ideology,  while looking briefly at how these problems have affected the society  which birthed it. This talk is not, however, intended to be a thorough  review of Postmodernism itself. Much rather I would like to focus [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><img class="alignright size-full wp-image-711" title="andy-warhol-marilyn" src="http://www.supsoc.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/10/andy-warhol-marilyn.jpg" alt="andy-warhol-marilyn" width="300" height="300" /></p>
<p>In this talk I would like to  address the inherent sociocultual problems of the Postmodernist ideology,  while looking briefly at how these problems have affected the society  which birthed it. This talk is not, however, intended to be a thorough  review of Postmodernism itself. Much rather I would like to focus more  on the dominant cultural ideology that I believe has superseded it:  Post-postmodernism.</p>
<p>Using stark examples of both  real and current social and cultural mechanisms I would like to demonstrate  how the “stifling irony” of Postmodernism appears to have been  replaced in the West, almost wholesale, by a hyper-consumptive optimism  - one which <em>moves on</em> from Postmodernism - allowing for genuine  progression <em>against</em> the stagnant regression of its predecessor.</p>
<p><strong>Tomos Lovett</strong> is an undergraduate student at the University of Sussex.</p>
<h3>Seminar recording</h3>
<p><br />
<a href="http://media.supsoc.org/past-events/2009/nothing-is-new.mp3">Download recording (.mp3 format)</a></p>
]]></content:encoded>
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<enclosure url="http://media.supsoc.org/past-events/2009/nothing-is-new.mp3" length="44018789" type="audio/mpeg" />
	<itunes:summary>In this talk I would like to  address the inherent sociocultual problems of the Postmodernist ideology,  while looking briefly at how these problems have affected the society  which birthed it. This talk is not, however, intended to be a thorough  review of Postmodernism itself. Much rather I would like to focus more  on the dominant cultural ideology that I believe has superseded it:  Post-postmodernism.
Using stark examples of both  real and current social and cultural mechanisms I would like to demonstrate  how the “stifling irony” of Postmodernism appears to have been  replaced in the West, almost wholesale, by a hyper-consumptive optimism  - one which moves on from Postmodernism - allowing for genuine  progression against the stagnant regression of its predecessor.
Tomos Lovett is an undergraduate student at the University of Sussex.
Seminar recording

Download recording (.mp3 format)</itunes:summary>
<itunes:subtitle>In this talk I would like to  address the inherent sociocultual problems of the Postmodernist ideology,  while looking briefly at how these problems have affected the society  which birthed it. This talk is not, however, intended to be a thorough  [...]</itunes:subtitle>
<itunes:author>Tomos Lovett</itunes:author>
<itunes:keywords>supsoc, sussex undergraduate philosophy society, postmodernism, tomos lovett</itunes:keywords>
<itunes:explicit>no</itunes:explicit>
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		<title>Prof. Michael Morris on Holiness and Virtue *</title>
		<link>http://www.supsoc.org/2009/10/21/prof-michael-morris-on-holiness-and-virtue/</link>
		<comments>http://www.supsoc.org/2009/10/21/prof-michael-morris-on-holiness-and-virtue/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 21 Oct 2009 16:00:31 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Peter</dc:creator>
		
		<category><![CDATA[Past Events]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.supsoc.org/?p=637</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[I begin from a question raised in Plato&#8217;s Euthyphro, whether holiness is only a part of virtue - only a part of what it is to be moral, if you like - or whether it is just all of it.  I consider what this must mean in the context of that dialogue, and connect it [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><img class="alignright size-medium wp-image-642" title="thegreateuthyphro" src="http://www.supsoc.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/10/thegreateuthyphro-271x300.jpg" alt="thegreateuthyphro" width="271" height="300" />I begin from a question raised in Plato&#8217;s <em>Euthyphro</em>, whether holiness is only a part of virtue - only a part of what it is to be moral, if you like - or whether it is just all of it.  I consider what this must mean in the context of that dialogue, and connect it with the rather odd approach to ethics taken by Wittgenstein at the end of the Tractatus.  Seen in this light, &#8216;holiness&#8217; is naturally understood as a name for the right attitude to what one might call the meaning of life.  The question then is what this has to do with being moral generally.</p>
<p><strong>Michael Morris </strong>is a professor of philosophy at the University of Sussex. His current principal research interests are in the philosophy of language, metaphysics, aesthetics, Wittgenstein (especially the <em>Tractatus</em>), and Plato. His recent publications include <a href="http://www.amazon.co.uk/Introduction-Philosophy-Language-Cambridge-Introductions/dp/0521603110"><em>An Introduction to the Philosophy of Language</em></a> and <a href="http://www.amazon.co.uk/Routledge-Philosophy-Guidebook-Wittgenstein-Guidebooks/dp/0415357225/ref=sr_1_4?ie=UTF8&amp;s=books&amp;qid=1254049772&amp;sr=1-4"><em>Routledge GuideBook to Wittgenstein and the </em>Tractatus</a>. More information about his research and publications can be found on his <a href="http://www.sussex.ac.uk/philosophy/profile1886.html">staff profile</a>.</p>
<h3>Seminar recording</h3>
<p><br />
<a href="http://media.supsoc.org/past-events/2009/holiness-and-virtue.mp3">Download recording (.mp3 format)</a></p>
]]></content:encoded>
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<enclosure url="http://media.supsoc.org/past-events/2009/holiness-and-virtue.mp3" length="54687609" type="audio/mpeg" />
	<itunes:summary>I begin from a question raised in Platos Euthyphro, whether holiness is only a part of virtue - only a part of what it is to be moral, if you like - or whether it is just all of it.  I consider what this must mean in the context of that dialogue, and connect it with the rather odd approach to ethics taken by Wittgenstein at the end of the Tractatus.  Seen in this light, holiness is naturally understood as a name for the right attitude to what one might call the meaning of life.  The question then is what this has to do with being moral generally.
Michael Morris is a professor of philosophy at the University of Sussex. His current principal research interests are in the philosophy of language, metaphysics, aesthetics, Wittgenstein (especially the Tractatus), and Plato. His recent publications include An Introduction to the Philosophy of Language and Routledge GuideBook to Wittgenstein and the Tractatus. More information about his research and publications can be found on his staff profile.
Seminar recording

Download recording (.mp3 format)</itunes:summary>
<itunes:subtitle>I begin from a question raised in Platos Euthyphro, whether holiness is only a part of virtue - only a part of what it is to be moral, if you like - or whether it is just all of it.  I consider what this must mean in the context of that [...]</itunes:subtitle>
<itunes:author>Prof. Michael Morris</itunes:author>
<itunes:keywords>supsoc, sussex undergraduate philosophy society, holiness, virtue</itunes:keywords>
	</item>
		<item>
		<title>Dr Andrew Chitty on Species-being and freedom *</title>
		<link>http://www.supsoc.org/2009/10/14/dr-andrew-chitty-on-species-being-and-freedom/</link>
		<comments>http://www.supsoc.org/2009/10/14/dr-andrew-chitty-on-species-being-and-freedom/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 14 Oct 2009 16:00:50 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Peter</dc:creator>
		
		<category><![CDATA[Past Events]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.supsoc.org/?p=638</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Marx&#8217;s early concept of species-being is often understood as an account of a transhistorical human essence. On this view the early Marx criticises capitalism because it alienates individuals from this essence. A natural criticism of Marx on this reading is that his account of the human essence is unsupported, so that in effect it is [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><img class="alignright size-medium wp-image-639" title="karl_marx_001" src="http://www.supsoc.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/09/karl_marx_001-213x300.jpg" alt="karl_marx_001" width="213" height="300" />Marx&#8217;s early concept of species-being is often understood as an account of a transhistorical human essence. On this view the early Marx criticises capitalism because it alienates individuals from this essence. A natural criticism of Marx on this reading is that his account of the human essence is unsupported, so that in effect it is nothing but a way of asserting a dogmatic moral ideal, that of voluntary production for the common good. In contrast to this reading, this paper tries to understand the concept of species-being in a different way, as a key concept in the early Marx&#8217;s attempt to produce a communist version of Hegel&#8217;s political philosophy. In the Philosophy of Right Hegel aims to describe the logical movement from family to civil society to the modern state as the progressive realisation of freedom, which is for him the essence of human beings. This description does not presuppose any more that a very thin notion of freedom as &#8216;being with oneself in one&#8217;s other&#8217;, and the institutions themselves provide a progressive account of what freedom is. In a similar way the early Marx aims to understand the historical movement from pre-capitalist to capitalist to communist society as the progressive realisation of freedom, which for him too is the essence of humanity. &#8216;Species-being&#8217;, the paper argues, should be understood as Marx&#8217;s attempt to reformulate the idea of human freedom in the light of this different understanding of its content and its realisation. For Marx capitalist society is not the denial of species-being but the penultimate stage in its realisation and thereby a partial explication of what it is.</p>
<p><strong>Andrew Chitty</strong> is a lecturer in philosophy at the University of Sussex. He is a member of the University&#8217;s Senate and Council, of the Executive Committee of the <a class="externallink" title="external resource" href="http://www.aristoteliansociety.org.uk/">Aristotelian Society</a>, and of the organising group of the <a class="externallink" title="external resource" href="http://www.marxandphilosophy.org.uk/">Marx and Philosophy Society</a>. His main research interest concerns the normative ground for the criticism of basic social and political institutions. More information about his research and publications can be found on his <a href="http://www.sussex.ac.uk/philosophy/profile8678.html">staff profile</a>.</p>
<h3>Seminar recording</h3>
<p><br />
<a href="http://media.supsoc.org/past-events/2009/species-being-freedom.mp3">Download recording (.mp3 format)</a></p>
]]></content:encoded>
			<wfw:commentRss>http://www.supsoc.org/2009/10/14/dr-andrew-chitty-on-species-being-and-freedom/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
<enclosure url="http://media.supsoc.org/past-events/2009/species-being-freedom.mp3" length="53002338" type="audio/mpeg" />
	<itunes:summary>Marxs early concept of species-being is often understood as an account of a transhistorical human essence. On this view the early Marx criticises capitalism because it alienates individuals from this essence. A natural criticism of Marx on this reading is that his account of the human essence is unsupported, so that in effect it is nothing but a way of asserting a dogmatic moral ideal, that of voluntary production for the common good. In contrast to this reading, this paper tries to understand the concept of species-being in a different way, as a key concept in the early Marxs attempt to produce a communist version of Hegels political philosophy. In the Philosophy of Right Hegel aims to describe the logical movement from family to civil society to the modern state as the progressive realisation of freedom, which is for him the essence of human beings. This description does not presuppose any more that a very thin notion of freedom as being with oneself in ones other, and the institutions themselves provide a progressive account of what freedom is. In a similar way the early Marx aims to understand the historical movement from pre-capitalist to capitalist to communist society as the progressive realisation of freedom, which for him too is the essence of humanity. Species-being, the paper argues, should be understood as Marxs attempt to reformulate the idea of human freedom in the light of this different understanding of its content and its realisation. For Marx capitalist society is not the denial of species-being but the penultimate stage in its realisation and thereby a partial explication of what it is.
Andrew Chitty is a lecturer in philosophy at the University of Sussex. He is a member of the Universitys Senate and Council, of the Executive Committee of the Aristotelian Society, and of the organising group of the Marx and Philosophy Society. His main research interest concerns the normative ground for the criticism of basic social and political institutions. More information about his research and publications can be found on his staff profile.
Seminar recording

Download recording (.mp3 format)</itunes:summary>
<itunes:subtitle>Marxs early concept of species-being is often understood as an account of a transhistorical human essence. On this view the early Marx criticises capitalism because it alienates individuals from this essence. A natural criticism of Marx on [...]</itunes:subtitle>
<itunes:author>Dr Andrew Chitty</itunes:author>
<itunes:keywords>supsoc, sussex undergraduate philosophy society, marx, species-being, freedom, hegel</itunes:keywords>
<itunes:explicit>no</itunes:explicit>
	</item>
		<item>
		<title>Dr Dylan Trigg on The Weird and Alien: An Introduction to Phenomenology *</title>
		<link>http://www.supsoc.org/2009/05/20/dr-dylan-trigg-on-the-weird-and-alien-an-introduction-to-phenomenology/</link>
		<comments>http://www.supsoc.org/2009/05/20/dr-dylan-trigg-on-the-weird-and-alien-an-introduction-to-phenomenology/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 20 May 2009 16:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Peter</dc:creator>
		
		<category><![CDATA[Past Events]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.supsoc.org/?p=330</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[&#8220;The Earth: a densely  populated planet, extended in space and time, floating in the galaxy,  and ultimately destined toward a protracted demise, in which all life  is reduced to archaeological remnants. Before this end, however, everyday  life on our planet continues, unabashed by remote and distant possibilities  of cosmic annihilation. [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p align="justify">&#8220;The Earth: a densely  populated planet, extended in space and time, floating in the galaxy,  and ultimately destined toward a protracted demise, in which all life  is reduced to archaeological remnants. Before this end, however, everyday  life on our planet continues, unabashed by remote and distant possibilities  of cosmic annihilation. But what would it be like to experience this  particular planet, as though from an alien perspective? How would we  affectively respond to such estrangement: with wonder or horror? And  how would philosophy benefit from such an exercise? In this paper, I  will provisionally think through these thoughts in two ways.</p>
<p align="justify">First, I will spend  some time considering the parallels between phenomenology and the writing  of H.P. Lovecraft. The point of this excursion is to identify how Lovecraft’s  creative renewal of the everyday world operates with the same principles  as that of phenomenology. Bringing to life the phenomenological method,  Lovecraft thus becomes a significant ally in the relation between the  everyday and the strange.</p>
<p>Second, I will conclude  by considering the idea that the alien planet often invoked in philosophical  anecdotes is Earth itself. In turn, this will lead me to consider notions  of anonymity, alienness, and estrangement more broadly. My secondary  object in this task is to introduce phenomenology as a method for those  who are perhaps not overly familiar with it, perhaps in the process  (re)discovering the strangeness of phenomenology itself.&#8221;</p>
<p><strong>Dr Dylan Trigg</strong> is an assosciate tutor at the University of Sussex. More information regarding his interests and publications is available on his website: <a href="http://www.dylantrigg.com/">www.dylantrigg.com</a></p>
<h3>Suggested reading</h3>
<ol>
<li> Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, “Cezanne’s    Doubt&#8221;, from Sense and Non-sense [1945], trans. Hubert &amp; Patricia Dreyfus (1964) &lt;<a href="http://faculty.uml.edu/rinnis/cezannedoubt.pdf" target="_self">http://faculty.uml.edu/rinnis/cezannedoubt.pdf</a>&gt;</li>
<li> Lovecraft, H.P., &#8220;From Beyond&#8221;, Dagonbytes.com, first published in The Fantasy Fan (1934) &lt;<a href="http://www.dagonbytes.com/thelibrary/lovecraft/frombeyond.htm" target="_self">http://www.dagonbytes.com/thelibrary/lovecraft/frombeyond.htm</a>&gt;</li>
</ol>
<h3>Seminar recording</h3>
<p><br />
<a href="http://media.supsoc.org/past-events/2009/weird-and-alien.mp3">Download recording (.mp3 format)</a></p>
]]></content:encoded>
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<enclosure url="http://media.supsoc.org/past-events/2009/weird-and-alien.mp3" length="43001082" type="audio/mpeg" />
	<itunes:summary>The Earth: a densely  populated planet, extended in space and time, floating in the galaxy,  and ultimately destined toward a protracted demise, in which all life  is reduced to archaeological remnants. Before this end, however, everyday  life on our planet continues, unabashed by remote and distant possibilities  of cosmic annihilation. But what would it be like to experience this  particular planet, as though from an alien perspective? How would we  affectively respond to such estrangement: with wonder or horror? And  how would philosophy benefit from such an exercise? In this paper, I  will provisionally think through these thoughts in two ways.
First, I will spend  some time considering the parallels between phenomenology and the writing  of H.P. Lovecraft. The point of this excursion is to identify how Lovecraft’s  creative renewal of the everyday world operates with the same principles  as that of phenomenology. Bringing to life the phenomenological method,  Lovecraft thus becomes a significant ally in the relation between the  everyday and the strange.
Second, I will conclude  by considering the idea that the alien planet often invoked in philosophical  anecdotes is Earth itself. In turn, this will lead me to consider notions  of anonymity, alienness, and estrangement more broadly. My secondary  object in this task is to introduce phenomenology as a method for those  who are perhaps not overly familiar with it, perhaps in the process  (re)discovering the strangeness of phenomenology itself.
Dr Dylan Trigg is an assosciate tutor at the University of Sussex. More information regarding his interests and publications is available on his website: www.dylantrigg.com
Suggested reading

 Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, “Cezanne’s    Doubt, from Sense and Non-sense [1945], trans. Hubert &amp; Patricia Dreyfus (1964) &lt;http://faculty.uml.edu/rinnis/cezannedoubt.pdf&gt;
 Lovecraft, H.P., From Beyond, Dagonbytes.com, first published in The Fantasy Fan (1934) &lt;http://www.dagonbytes.com/thelibrary/lovecraft/frombeyond.htm&gt;

Seminar recording

Download recording (.mp3 format)</itunes:summary>
<itunes:subtitle>The Earth: a densely  populated planet, extended in space and time, floating in the galaxy,  and ultimately destined toward a protracted demise, in which all life  is reduced to archaeological remnants. Before this end, however, everyday  [...]</itunes:subtitle>
<itunes:author>Dr Dylan Trigg</itunes:author>
<itunes:keywords>phenomenology</itunes:keywords>
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		<title>Dr Milos Sevcik: Three Interpretations of the End of Art *</title>
		<link>http://www.supsoc.org/2009/05/13/dr-milos-sevcik-on-three-interpretations-of-the-end-of-art/</link>
		<comments>http://www.supsoc.org/2009/05/13/dr-milos-sevcik-on-three-interpretations-of-the-end-of-art/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 13 May 2009 08:54:27 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Peter</dc:creator>
		
		<category><![CDATA[Past Events]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.supsoc.org/?p=396</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[&#8220;In my talk, I follow three  different but also kindred philosophical approaches to G. W. F. Hegel’s  thesis of the “past character of art”. Martin Heidegger, Jan Patočka  and Jean-Luc Nancy draw attention to the clairvoyance and the acuity  of this Hegel’s statement. They meditate on the radical change of  [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="http://www.brightonfestival.org/Anish_Kapoor_3.aspx"><img class="size-medium wp-image-490 alignright" title="dismembermentofjeannedarc2" src="http://www.supsoc.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/05/dismembermentofjeannedarc2-300x195.jpg" alt="dismembermentofjeannedarc2" width="300" height="195" /></a><strong></strong>&#8220;In my talk, I follow three  different but also kindred philosophical approaches to G. W. F. Hegel’s  thesis of the “past character of art”. Martin Heidegger, Jan Patočka  and Jean-Luc Nancy draw attention to the clairvoyance and the acuity  of this Hegel’s statement. They meditate on the radical change of  the status of art in the beginning of modern time and especially on  the possibility of an expression of truth by modern artworks. Heidegger  is doubtful in this regard; he questions the very possibility of the  unveiling of truth in the art of the present and future. Patočka supposes  that the art of the present offers certain truth, even if this truth  is radically different from the truth expressed by artworks of foregoing  centuries. This truth is not objective and binding, but subjective and  individual. Nancy assumes that modern artworks do not present truth  as a manifestation, but as a pure presentation, i.e. as aisthesis. Accordingly,  this truth is inevitably fragmentary. Of course, together with this  question of the status of truth of modern art, the question of the very  essence of art is posed as well. Is modern art only something superficial  or even mistaken? Or does modern art show the reality of art as such  from a previously unheard of perspective? If yes, what is the relation  between modern secular art and religious art of the past? Is there any  connection? Or is there only radical discontinuity?&#8221;</p>
<p><strong>Dr Milos Sevcik</strong> is Assistant Director of the Department of Aesthetics at Charles University, Prague.</p>
<h3>Seminar recording</h3>
<p><br />
<a href="http://media.supsoc.org/past-events/2009/end-of-art.mp3">Download recording (.mp3 format)</a></p>
]]></content:encoded>
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<enclosure url="http://media.supsoc.org/past-events/2009/end-of-art.mp3" length="42401068" type="audio/mpeg" />
	<itunes:summary>In my talk, I follow three  different but also kindred philosophical approaches to G. W. F. Hegel’s  thesis of the “past character of art”. Martin Heidegger, Jan Patočka  and Jean-Luc Nancy draw attention to the clairvoyance and the acuity  of this Hegel’s statement. They meditate on the radical change of  the status of art in the beginning of modern time and especially on  the possibility of an expression of truth by modern artworks. Heidegger  is doubtful in this regard; he questions the very possibility of the  unveiling of truth in the art of the present and future. Patočka supposes  that the art of the present offers certain truth, even if this truth  is radically different from the truth expressed by artworks of foregoing  centuries. This truth is not objective and binding, but subjective and  individual. Nancy assumes that modern artworks do not present truth  as a manifestation, but as a pure presentation, i.e. as aisthesis. Accordingly,  this truth is inevitably fragmentary. Of course, together with this  question of the status of truth of modern art, the question of the very  essence of art is posed as well. Is modern art only something superficial  or even mistaken? Or does modern art show the reality of art as such  from a previously unheard of perspective? If yes, what is the relation  between modern secular art and religious art of the past? Is there any  connection? Or is there only radical discontinuity?
Dr Milos Sevcik is Assistant Director of the Department of Aesthetics at Charles University, Prague.
Seminar recording

Download recording (.mp3 format)</itunes:summary>
<itunes:subtitle>In my talk, I follow three  different but also kindred philosophical approaches to G. W. F. Hegel’s  thesis of the “past character of art”. Martin Heidegger, Jan Patočka  and Jean-Luc Nancy draw attention to the clairvoyance and the [...]</itunes:subtitle>
<itunes:author>Dr Milos Sevcik</itunes:author>
<itunes:keywords>hegel, heidegger, aesthetics</itunes:keywords>
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